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Abstract
Background: The issue of whether other animals have
internally felt experiences has vexed animal behavioral
science since its inception. Although most investigators
remain agnostic on such contentious issues, there is now
abundant experimental evidence indicating that all
mammals have negatively and positively-valenced emo-
tional networks concentrated in homologous brain
regions that mediate affective experiences when animals
are emotionally aroused. That is what the neuroscientific
evidence indicates.
Principal Findings: The relevant lines of evidence are as
follows: 1) It is easy to elicit powerful unconditioned
emotional responses using localized electrical stimulation
of the brain (ESB); these effects are concentrated in
ancient subcortical brain regions. Seven types of emo-
tional arousals have been described; using a special
capitalized nomenclature for such primary process emo-
tional systems, they are SEEKING, RAGE, FEAR, LUST, CARE,
PANIC/GRIEF and PLAY. 2) These brain circuits are situated
in homologous subcortical brain regions in all vertebrates
tested. Thus, if one activates FEAR arousal circuits in rats,
cats or primates, all exhibit similar fear responses. 3) All
primary-process emotional-instinctual urges, even ones as
complex as social PLAY, remain intact after radical neo-
decortication early in life; thus, the neocortex is not
essential for the generation of primary-process emotion-
ality. 4) Using diverse measures, one can demonstrate that
animals like and dislike ESB of brain regions that evoke
unconditioned instinctual emotional behaviors: Such ESBs
can serve as ‘rewards’ and ‘punishments’ in diverse
approach and escape/avoidance learning tasks. 5) Com-
parable ESB of human brains yield comparable affective
experiences. Thus, robust evidence indicates that raw
primary-process (i.e., instinctual, unconditioned) emotional
behaviors and feelings emanate from homologous brain
functions in all mammals (see Appendix S1), which are
regulated by higher brain regions. Such findings suggest
nested-hierarchies of BrainMind affective processing, with
primal emotional functions being foundational for sec-
ondary-process learning and memory mechanisms, which
interface with tertiary-process cognitive-thoughtful func-
tions of the BrainMind.
Introduction
The most intense affective experiences humans ever have are
during emotional episodes. All other mammals exhibit similar
types of emotional arousals. But do they experience affective states
when their external behaviors are intensely emotional? Most
interested scholars and the public at large answer, ‘‘Obviously they
do.’’ This everyday conclusion is now supported by both
behavioral [1] and neuroscientific evidence [2,3]. However, most
careful scholars who scientifically study emotions tend to assume
an agnostic stance. Let me only consider a most recent example:
Mendl, Burman, and Paul [4], at the beginning of a fine recent
paper on the emotional choices made by animals, carefully
indicated that the emotional behaviors of animals ‘‘may or may
not be experienced consciously.’’ An accompanying commentary
on that article highlighted epistemological ways out of such
conundrums, by basing arguments on triangulated evidence from
affective neuroscience [5]—relating i) brain mechanisms, to both
ii) behavior and iii) experiential-affective analyses (see below).
Behavior-only research cannot achieve definitive conclusions,
since it has no direct access to underlying affective infrastructure
of certain brain mechanisms. Thus, if we just analyze behavior, we
have no empirical way out of the conundrum of belief-based
conclusions. With the inclusion of neuroscience, especially direct
evaluation of the affective properties of the underlying brain
systems, we can base our conclusions on evidence, and the position
advanced here is that abundant data has long indicated that
animals do experience their emotional arousals. In short,
activation of various brain systems can serve as ‘‘rewards’’ and
‘‘punishments’’ in various learning tasks [2]. Thus, we know
approximately where affective states are generated in the brain
although we do not know exactly how. Such subcortical loci of
control allow us to entertain the idea that a study of emotional
circuits in animal brains can illuminate the primal sources of
human emotional feelings. But the relevant brain and behavioral/
psychological sciences have yet to embrace such conclusions, and
agnosticism prevails. Thus, this paper is premised on the fact that
it is within the brain mechanisms of unconditioned emotional
behaviors where we find the strongest empirical evidence for the
emotional feelings of animals.
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experienced emotions in other creatures (a form of phenomenal
consciousness) raises important issues for animal welfare debates
and provides scientific paths for working out the neural
mechanisms that generate valuative internal experiences in other
animals. That knowledge could guide understanding of the
foundations of our own brains and minds. Of course, there
continues to exist a widespread fear of anthropomorphism in the
cross-species brain sciences (Figure 1), which may no longer be as
wise as it seemed just a few decades ago [2]. This paper discusses
the kinds of evidence that currently provide the most robust
scientific support for the existence of subjective affective
experiences in the animals we study. Namely, if artificial
experimental arousal of brain networks that control emotional
behaviors can also routinely serve as ‘rewards’ and ‘punishments’
that can guide learning, then the evidence for certain types of
positive and negative experiences in their brains, may we say minds,
is close to definitive. That is, unless one could routinely
demonstrate that ‘rewards’ and ‘punishments’ in humans are
typically unconscious—a data base that does not exist. Thus, the
goal of this essay is to discuss whether other animals are feeling
creatures not just on the basis of reasoned arguments (which is
common, see the Denouement at the very end of this paper), but
also in the context of the most relevant neuroscientific evidence.
Thus, the following conclusion is empirically justified: At the very
least, all other mammals experience their emotional arousals.
Analysis
The Affective Sources of the BrainMind: Cross-Species
Neuroevolutionary Perspectives
The behavioral data for animal emotions have been definitive
for a long time, from Darwin (1872) to Mendl et al this past year
[4], so to speak. However an equally important but comparatively
neglected issue is whether animals have the kinds of brains that
can engender subjectively experienced states. Such ‘‘mind stuff’’
can only be scientifically penetrated with functional neuroscience.
To reiterate the most critical point already noted: If one can
demonstrate that brain networks that participate in generating
coherent emotional reactions also mediate ‘rewarding’ and
‘punishing’ states within the brain, without employing any external
objects such as food and water to train animals, we would have
robust evidence for locating central processing stations for certain
types of affective experiences in specific brain regions and circuits.
Further, if certain underlying circuit attributes in animals (e.g.,
neurochemistries) modulate the within-brain processes that lead
various external events to be rewarding and punishing in both
animals and humans, we will have fulfilled another critical
experiential prediction. There are abundant investigations of drug
addictions (especially for morphine and various psychostimulants),
that will not be summarized here, that satisfy that criterion.
Further because of evolutionary homologies in the underlying
subcortical brain mechanisms in all mammals, the above
knowledge offers direct predictions to qualitative human experi-
ences following similar brain manipulations. In other words, if our
predictions about changing internal feelings in humans, derived
from the animal data, are supported by human self-reports, as has
often been the case [2,6], we have additional reasons for
confidence that both humans and animals are having similar
(albeit not identical) experiences.
Indeed, the above criteria, based on many studies of electrical
stimulation of the brain (ESB) and chemical stimulation of the
brain (CSB), have supported the existence of emotional feelings in
animals for many years; such stimulation can trigger emotional-
behavioral episodes, yielding brain states of various kinds that also
serve to motivate various learned approach-and-avoidance
behaviors, providing abundant evidence for positive and negative
feelings in animals. This gets us as close as we can presently get
scientifically to the mechanisms that generate affective feelings in
mammalian brains. In addition, if humans report distinct
emotional experiences from such brain sites, we have additional
prima facie evidence for corresponding types of emotional feelings in
Figure 1. A truth diagram of anthropomorphism. A truth diagram relating how we need to think about the possible affective nature of animals
(The true nature of the world) and our corresponding scientific judgments about the world. Most of the 20th century was spent believing that the
right lower corner was the correct place to be philosophically so one could avoid Type I errors, namely concluding something that is not true to be
scientifically correct. This led to discussions of ‘‘anxiety-like’’ behaviors in animals as opposed to fear in animals. This article is premised on the data-
based conclusion that individuals who are conversant with the relevant data are wise to situate themselves in the upper left quadrant, since that way
we can avoid Type II errors, namely the failure to detect a real phenomenon, because we have false beliefs, or inadequate methods to evaluate the
presence of a phenomenon.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021236.g001
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affective states is achieved by higher brain mechanisms that are
activated by emotional arousals, but that would have to be deemed
a ‘‘second best’’ hypothesis for it becomes un-parsimonious by
adding an additional loop of complexity to the overall equation.
Why has substantive knowledge about animal emotional feelings
had so little effect on the debate about the existence of subjective
experiences in animals? Especially when such knowledge may
clarify the sources of affective emotional experiences in humans?
This appears to be due to a sustained bias during most of the 20
th
century that the internal experiences of animals are outside the
realm of rigorous scientific inquiry [7]. Of course, the attitude of
skepticism is deeply valued by many scientists, including myself.
However, there are many historical antecedents where, because of
this precious attitude, critical lines of existing evidence were
devalued without counter-evidence and hence new evidence-based
conclusions were not adequately considered, and hence have been
long neglected. This has often slowed down the progress of science
because of prevailing biases against transformational concepts that
are unwelcome in the Zeitgeist. For instance, one common bias
among behaviorists of the 20
th century was that the brain did not
need to be understood to have a coherent science of behavior.
That attitude may have seemed fair enough before modern
neuroscience, but because the study of the ‘‘black-box’’ was long
marginalized, when neuroscientific knowledge suggested that an
understanding of emotional states was ripe for the picking, there
were few to harvest the low hanging fruit.
Now that there is abundant relevant neuroscience in the field
(aka, behavioral neuroscience), which has quite consistently
provided evidence for the rewarding and punishing nature of
brain circuits that mediate emotional behaviors [2,3,6], affective
constructs are still not widely used because of the continuing fear
of anthropomorphism, making it a still prevailing attitude that
presently is evolutionarily unfounded (see Figure 1). The failure of
affective concepts to become common currency in animal research
has, I would argue, had negative influence on cross-disciplinary
integrations, which could have rapidly advanced fields like
biological psychiatry, through the recognition that emotional
feelings were ancient functions of medially situated brainstem
regions. Instead, when cognitive neuroscientists became intensely
interested in emotions with the ready availability of modern brain
imaging in the mid 1990s, most investigators accepted the
traditional view that not only was the neocortex the seat of
conscious thought, but also of emotional feelings. As a result,
emotional feelings were not granted to animals, for they were
commonly deemed to be a form of thought, and affective and
cognitive processes were envisioned to be completely interpene-
trant in higher brain regions that generated certain higher
cognitive processes such as frontal cortical regions.
Indeed considering the evolutionarily layered nature of brain
organization, I will argue that one can readily use cross-species
anthropomorphic reasoning at primary-process subcortical MindBrain
levels, albeit not at the tertiary-process neocortical levels, as
summarized in Figure 2. These primal evolutionary concepts will
be discussed more extensively after a thumbnail sketch of the recent
history of the field that has generally slowed the acceptance of
animal emotional feelings, as a gateway to understanding both
human and animal emotions, asa key topic of experimental inquiry.
Historical Perspectives
As already noted, Charles Darwin (1809–1882), who wrote
what is widely deemed to be the first modern scientific treatment
Figure 2. Levels of control in brain emotion-affective processing. A summary of the global levels of control within the brain 1) with 3 general
types of affects (red), 2) three types of basic learning mechanisms (green), and 3) three representative awareness functions (blue) of the neocortex
(which relies completely on multiple levels of integration, with descending controls down through the basal ganglia to the thalamus, looping back to
neocortex) before it can fully elaborate both thoughts and behavior).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021236.g002
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have emotional lives not all that different from our own. With his
principle of evolutionary continuity of mind among animals, he
suggested that understanding animal emotions could scientifically
illuminate our own emotional lives [8]. Darwin had no problem in
imputing emotional feelings to other animals.
Darwin’s view, however, did not percolate clearly up to the
present-day, namely to the neurobehavioral and neuropsycholog-
ical sciences. Indeed, the theories of many subsequent thinkers,
starting prominently with William James, focused on the possibility
that higher cognitive regions of the brain mediate our emotional
feelings, not just the many thoughts that accompany our emotional
arousals. Thus, many scholars at present continue to believe that
emotional feelings are a subset of cognitive processes, as did
scholars over a century ago. Indeed, the special whole issue of
Cognition & Emotion devoted to this topic entitled ‘‘How distinctive
is affective processing’’ (published in 2007, vol 21(6) edited by
Andreas Eder, et al.) generally supports the conclusion that affects
are just a subset of cognitive type brain activities, namely based on
sensory information processing principles as opposed to intrinsic
bodily emotional states (i.e., specific forms of unconditioned
responses).
The most famous of these affective-cognitive conflations was
advanced in 1885 when William James (1842–1910) [9] and Carl
Lange (1834–1900) [10] suggested that emotional feelings merely
reflect cortical-cognitive ‘readouts’ of peripheral-unconscious
autonomic arousals that occur in our bodies when we exert
ourselves in emergency situations—for instance, running away
from bears. In this interpretation, bodily information reaches the
sensory regions of the cerebral cortex, where the sensations of
bodily arousals are transformed into emotional experiences. In
effect, emotion-related bodily commotions were integrated into
emotional feelings by higher mental processes. Among many
scholars, this vision of emotionality served to bring into question
the existence of emotional feelings in other animals because they
have so much less higher ‘‘cognitive brain’’ matter (i.e., neocortex)
compared to humans. But all this happened before we understood
the evolutionary construction of the brain, and the recognition
that many vast emotional integrative networks, especially for
unconditioned emotional responses, were built into the subcortical
structure of all mammalian brains during the long course of brain
evolution.
This type of neocortical ‘readout’ hypothesis/opinion has
survived the test of time but not the test of experimental
evidence—in short, it is still widely discussed and believed without
hardly any critical (causal) evidence to support it, even though
brain-imaging correlates can be and often are used to support that
archaic conclusion. The James-Lange theory became ingrained in
psychological science belief systems long before anyone knew
much about the emotional networks of mammalian brains, and
there it seems to remain, a well-fossilized construct. There were
compelling challenges as far back as the 1920s [11], never
empirically refuted. Thus, in the emerging brain sciences of the
1970s, the view that we cannot empirically study the emotional
feelings of other animals, because they have relatively little
neocortex, remained the prevailing view, albeit the topic itself was
rarely discussed in neuroscientific circles. Thereby traditional
skepticism and agnosticism continued to prevail as the guiding
principles in most rare discussions of the topic.
Partly, this stance may have also reflected the widespread
rejection of psychoanalytic theory as a scientific way to
conceptualize the mind in that era. Although Sigmund Freud
(1856–1939) had spent the first decade of his career as a
neuroscientist (for a full translation of Freud’s neuroscientific
contributions, see Solms [12]), his theories, along with those of
many of his followers, had made emotions the centerpiece of his
psychoanalytic theories and therapies. The failure of such ideas to
be subjected to rigorous empirical evaluation, along with the rise
of the cognitive and neuroscience revolutions, also diminished the
importance of emotions as a topic for experimental study because
it was deemed too difficult a problem to solve—namely, how could
we ever really know what other animals experienced?
It is noteworthy that Freud repeatedly recognized that a lasting
understanding of the mind and emotions, could not be achieved
without neuroscience. He often remarked that we could not make
sense of affective feelings until we came to terms with the inbuilt
‘‘instinctual’’ nature of emotionality. Freud often claimed that
affective states were never unconscious; they were, by definition,
always experienced. But he recognized that an empirical-
neuroscientific understanding of emotions and other mental-
experiential features of the brain could not be achieved in his era,
and he decided not to share his speculative neural theories, only
later discovered in his posthumously published Project for a Scientific
Psychology. But soon thereafter, behavioral scientists definitively
denied that it was empirically possible to study mental events in
animals scientifically, and the book was closed on such topics for a
long time. It is only slowly opening, and usually only with regard to
their self-evident emotional behaviors, as Darwin recognized, but
not their emotional feelings.
As a result, Darwin’s famous dictum [13] that the differences in
the mental lives of animals are ‘‘one of degree and not of kind’’
never served as a jumping-off point for the scientific understanding
of human emotional feelings by studying explicit animal emotional
actions, with but a few exceptions (e.g., MacLean [14] and
Panksepp [2]). The lack of attention paid to the affective lives of
other animals, as opposed to simply their emotional behaviors, by
scientists was not simply because Darwin’s complete view was
rather more subtle than the fragment shared above: ‘‘There can be
no doubt that the difference between the mind of the lowest man
and that of the highest animal is immense….Nevertheless the
difference….great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not kind’’
([13] p. 127). Now we can be confident that the major degrees of
cognitive differences have arisen from higher brain encephaliza-
tions, while affective feelings are largely sub-neocortical brain
functions.
In sum, the continuing lack of explicit work and discussion in
scientific annals about the neural nature of emotional feelings in
animals was based on the generally accepted ontological view that
the subjective lives of other organisms were impenetrable, while
their emotional behaviors were not. Thus, a cross-species
evolutionary approach to studying the bodies of animals was
welcomed, but their minds were neglected. If for no other reason
than contextualizing the present arguments, it is important to be
clear about the forces that led science to neglect the emotional
feelings of animals.
So let me flesh out the above history in modest detail. Despite
promising initiatives early in the 20
th century, such as the work of
Walter Cannon [11] in physiology and McDougall in psychology
[15], discussions of the mental aspects of brain functions that
control animal behaviors withered. With the move toward ultra
‘‘positivism’’ in philosophy (e.g., the so called Vienna School)
which reinforced the behaviorist revolution, mental concepts in
scientific discussions of animal behaviors seemed less important
than ever. Behavior could be operationalized, but mind could not.
The easiest behaviors to study systematically in the laboratory
were those shaped through ‘reinforcement’ contingencies in
various automated learning paradigms—classical conditioning,
and training of conditioned lever presses and such. This led to a
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‘‘The ‘emotions’ are excellent examples of the fictional causes to
which we commonly attribute behavior’’ [16]. It is no secret that
to this day many, perhaps most, behavioral neuroscientists deny
that we have scientific access to the emotional mind of animals,
albeit there are many strands of thinking outside the scientific
mainstream that appreciate the likelihood that animal minds are
real and can be understood (see the final ‘‘Denouement’’ section of
this paper).
Nobel Prize-winning ethologist Niko Tinbergen (1907–1988)
put it succinctly and poignantly in his celebrated Study of Instinct
(1951) [17]: ‘‘Because subjective phenomena cannot be observed
objectively in animals, it is idle to claim or deny their existence’’
([17] p. 5). In the same period, Nobel laureate Walter Hess
discovered that rage could be readily evoked by ESB of the
hypothalamus in cats. Later in life he indicated that he chose to
describe the angry-type attack behaviors as being ‘sham-rage’
because he did not want to have his work marginalized by the
behaviorist school. In fact, his unshared personal conviction had
been that those rage-like behaviors reflected true experiences of
anger. With the transformation of substantial segments of
methodological behaviorism to ‘‘behavioral and cognitive neuro-
science’’ strategies (starting explicitly in the early 1970s), Hess’s
original views were accepted as state of the art conclusions (despite
demonstrations of the punishing properties of the underlying
circuits [2]). And it is clear to all in the field that discussions of
animal experiences in academic neuroscience and psychology
have remained muted to the present day.
A few ethologists, most prominently Don Griffin (1915–2003)
[18,19], did argue forcefully for cognitive mentality (e.g., thoughts)
in animals, and a few others have entertained the existence of
experienced emotions in animals (e.g., see the Don Griffin memorial
issue of Consciousness & Cognition, March 2005). However, the
upshot of the above history is that, at present, most scientists seem
disinterested or choose to remain agnostic on such issues. This
essay seeks to highlight how abundant cross-species affective
neuroscience research, in fact, now strongly supports the everyday
insight—‘‘of course, other animals have emotional feelings’’
without anyone needing to claim that they are identical to the
evolutionarily homologous human feelings. Evolution is diversity,
with homologies highlighting relatedness without any claims about
identity.
Thus, the present essay seeks to bring scientific thinking about
these issues into line with the weight of evidence indicating that all
mammals share not only very similar instinctual emotional
behaviors, but that the activities of the underlying brain networks
are closely associated with the feelings of raw emotion. The
implications of these discoveries are potentially of profound
importance for the evolutionary discussions of human minds, the
utility of preclinical translational approaches in biological
psychiatry and the foundational nature of ethics, as well as the
slowly growing appreciation of the evolutionary continuities in
MindBrain functions in all mammals, and probably all other
vertebrates.
In this vision, the primary-process affective mind emerged much
earlier in evolution than our sophisticated cognitive minds. And I
will advance the premise that what came first in evolution, namely
that which is primary-process, still serves as a critical foundation
for what came later, including some of our higher mental abilities.
It is likely that our vast cognitive abilities, and those of other highly
cerebrated mammals, were constructed upon an affective-
emotional infrastructure that all mammals share homologously.
Within such a view, many of the presuppositions of psychology,
cognitive science, and neuroscience may be turned on their
collective heads. Many of our higher mental abilities are
comparatively unconscious, meaning unexperienced, for instance,
key aspects of cognitive brain functions such as the basic
mechanisms of learning and memory. In contrast, the affective
foundations are intensely experienced—since they can serve as
‘rewards’ and ‘punishments’ in learning—albeit those psycholog-
ical states are, at times, hard to translate into words, symbols
which more effectively describe external sensory-perceptual
abilities than emotional ones.
The Evolutionary Layering of the BrainMind
First, an explanation of the use of the term BrainMind and
MindBrain in this essay: We all know that dualistic thought has
traditionally separated brain and mind, but most neuroscientists
who consider such issues now accept that mental processes,
namely internal experiences, are thoroughly linked to neural
dynamics. Hence it may be wiser to have a monistic term, that
does not prioritize either mind or brain, but combines the concepts
into a unified term (common variants are brain-mind or mind-
brain). Perhaps it makes more ontological sense to simply pull
them together into a unified concept, where both variants can be
used flexibly depending on the type of argument pursued: With the
recognition that the brain has retained anatomical signs of
evolutionary layerings, perhaps BrainMind is better for discussing
bottom up issues, while MindBrain could be reserved for top-down
ones. Since the highest levels of mind (thoughts and plans) are
clearly dependent on neocortical functions, they are truly much
harder to study experimentally and experientially in animals than the
basic emotional affects. Implicitly experienced cognitive processes
have no clear behavioral markers as do measures of affective
valence (i.e., rewarding and punishing BrainMind functions that
correspond to certain unconditioned response systems of the
brain).
It has been challenging to generate a coherent nomenclature for
primary-process categories of mind, such as the basic emotions in
animals. I have sought to do this most pointedly for the
foundational level—the primary-process level of analysis that is
the focus of this essay. The primary-process brain mechanisms for
emotions are situated very low and medial in the brain (midbrain,
diencephalon and related basal ganglia) which affirms their
ancient nature in brain evolution. The higher and more forward
expansions of the brain provide neural networks for our higher
cognitive abilities. Of course, the layering is relative, with many
integrative issues in-between that bind the BrainMind into a
coherently operating unit.
Still, if we consider such ‘‘layered’’ evolution of brain
organization, as many neuroscientists do (although perhaps not
favored by behaviorists or cognitivists), then the localization of a
variety of emotional circuits in deep subcortical regions (which
unambiguously mediate ‘reward’ and ‘punishment’ functions)
strongly supports the conclusion that other animals do experience
their own emotional arousals. The alternative— that subcortical
rewards and punishments are not experienced at all, or that
affective experiences arise only by some type of ‘readout’ by higher
brain mechanisms—is not consistent with the evidence. For
instance, if that were the case, then it would be easier to evoke
rewards and punishments from higher brain regions using brain
stimulation, but as neuroscientists who have conducted such work
have long known, just the reverse is the case. The lower brain
systems sustain reward and punishment functions with the lowest
amounts of brain stimulation. Indeed, there is no coherent stream
of data that discrete activations of neocortical functions in animals
arouse any robust reward or punishment functions. In contrast, the
existence of unambiguous experimentally evoked subcortical reward
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definitive. This provides abundant and consistent support for the
idea that raw affective feelings are, in fact, a property of certain
ancient subcortical midline brain networks in action. However, it
does not tell us exactly what the animal is feeling, only that the
feelings fall in certain categories such as positive and negative
affects of various kinds.
Further, studies of animals and humans that have been
decorticated—i.e., had the brain’s cortex surgically removed—
bear out such conclusions: Primal emotional responses are spared,
even strengthened [20–22]. This also fits with the common
observation that people with dementia typically retain emotional
responsivity much more than cognitive abilities. In brief, we have
long known that not only can we provoke a variety of instinctual
(unconditioned) emotional patterns in animals with localized
subcortical ESB, but we also know that such evoked states feel
good and bad to animals [3,6,23,24]. It is much harder to be clear
about the type of feeling that is generated. But it is from these same
brain zones that we can evoke the strongest types of diverse self-
reports of distinct affective experiences in humans, and the
descriptions of feelings aroused generally match the emotional
behavioral patterns that are evoked in animals [25,26]. Further,
since we do know that some of the positive effects are
discriminated by animals [27] and many can be differentially
influenced by direct manipulation of relevant brain chemistries
[2], evidence supports the existence of diverse types of rewarding
and punishing BrainMind states, not just homogenous positive and
negative affective functions.
But is there proof? Scientists, who most value skepticism (i.e.,
‘‘show me, please’’), realize that experimentation never proves
anything. It only provides the ‘‘weight of evidence’’ for one view
or another. From that perspective, we should all now agree that
various emotional affective internal experiences have, in fact,
been abundantly and empirically validated in other animals. If
not, we would have to provide evidence and realistic hypothesis-
based argumentation for how environmental ‘rewards’ and
‘punishments’ promote predictable learned behavioral changes.
If they do so without arousing brain affective processes in
animals, we have a conundrum on our hands, since they routinely
have such effects in humans. Thus, at present, skepticism has
gone too far, toward the diametrically opposite realm of belief—
that something already well demonstrated does not, in fact, exist.
In other words, simply saying that certain ‘objects and events’ of
the world ‘reinforce’ behavior will not do. ‘‘Reinforcement’’ is not
yet a demonstrated brain function; it is a procedure to train
animals. That process in the brain is just a conjecture. The
existence of certain affects is not.
It is more coherent, and I would submit, closer to the truth, to
say that the concept of reinforcement is the name we give to the way
the brain’s primary-process affective feeling networks facilitate
long-term learned behavioral changes. Indeed, such unconditioned
stimulus and response circuits are critical for most of the types of
learning commonly studied by behaviorists, to proceed within the
brain.
This could herald a sea change in the way we envision brain
mechanisms of emotional conditioning. Such a view—a modest
conceptual readjustment—could put a very different twist on the
underlying mechanisms that control commonly studied learning
such as ‘fear conditioning’—namely, it may be the raw
(unconditional) neural FEAR integration circuits that generate
fearful psychological states that attract external information into
their orbit. In other words the neuropsychological processes that
evolved earlier—e.g., the brain processes that experimental
psychologists traditionally call ‘‘unconditional stimuli’’ and
‘‘unconditional responses’’—are of critical importance for setting
up homologous secondary-processes of learning and memory in all
species. Such a levels-of-control vision of evolutionary BrainMind
layering suggests nested-hierarchy types of emotional organization
(Figure 3).
The primary-process (i.e., basic or primordial) emotions are fine
candidates for such functions. However, they are concentrated in
such deep and ancient neural networks that there are no generally-
accepted experimental strategies to decode their neural nature in
humans in any detail. The subcortical organization of emotional
affects in our own species is now supported by human brain
imaging of basic emotions, as summarized in Figure 4. Animal
brain research can achiever higher levels of resolution.
Without a solid cross-species neuroscientific foundation, it may
be difficult to make sense of the subsequent mental developments
of our species—e.g., the way our cognitive apparatus is often
subservient to our emotional feelings. This is inherent in the nested
hierarchical view of brain function depicted in Figure 3. Thus, at
the foundational level, the differences between human subjective
emotional experiences and the mental lives of other mammals may
be ‘‘one of degree and not of kind’’ as Darwin surmised, but now
we know that the subcortical organization of the emotional systems
in mammalian brains is remarkably homologous [2]. An
evolutionarily informed cross-species affective neuroscience
[3,23,24] can now sever the conceptual Gordian knot we have
created for ourselves across the years, and solve the mystery of
emotional-affective experience in humans as well as other animals.
But this Darwinian knife cuts two ways: i) It can return many
animals to the ‘circle of affect’ from which they were excluded by
scientists, putting additional responsibilities on scientists who wish
to conduct ethical research. ii) If animals do experience their
Figure 3. Nested hierarchies of control within the brain. A
summary of the hierarchical bottom-up and top-down (circular)
causation that is proposed to operate in every primal emotional system
of the brain. The schematic summarizes the hypothesis that in order for
higher MindBrain functions to mature and function (via bottom-up
control), they have to be integrated with the lower BrainMind functions,
with primary-processes being depicted as squares (red), secondary-
process learning as circles (green), and tertiary processes, by rectangles
(blue). The color-coding aims to convey the manner in which nested-
hierarchies are integrating lower brain functions into higher brain
functions to eventually exert top-down regulatory control (adapted
from Northoff, et al. [47]).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021236.g003
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survival needs, but neuroscientists neglect those aspects of
mammalian BrainMind functions, then there can never be any
deep neuroscientific understanding of the intrinsic values of
human brains. If we continue to neglect the study of emotional
experiences in animals, which is currently still common in the
field, we may never learn how our human affective feelings are
generated, and we will thereby fail to achieve a deep neural
understanding of major evolutionary processes that still control
our mind and behavior, and our various psychiatric disorders.
Synopsis of the Classic Evidence and the Needed
Integration With Modern Neuroscience
Arguments that we will never be able to scientifically measure
the emotional feelings of animals notwithstanding, we have known
for a long time that direct stimulation of a variety of subcortical
emotional circuits generate ‘reward’ and ‘punishment’ functions in
various learning tasks (see research from the era of Delgado,
Miller, and colleagues [28], Heath [29] and Olds and Milner [30]
in the early 1950s, to the work of MacLean and Panksepp in the
1970s and 80s [14,23,31]. There are 21
st century indications of a
revival of serious research into the affective functions of
mammalian brains [6,32].
If the discovery of central nervous system affective ‘rewards’ and
‘punishments’ cannot be used as a reasonable gold standard for
validating the idea that animals do experience their own emotional
arousals, I see no credible experimental approach to understand-
ing mental states in other animals nor, as a consequence, ever
understanding the neural details of our own raw emotional
experiences.
A Terminological Interlude
The development of a standard scientific nomenclature that can
be used to discuss animal minds, in the present case emotional
feelings, is bound to be a difficult task. Part of the problem is that
all our natural languages are learned skills, tethered to our
genetically dictated communicative urges that are molded into an
infinite variety of learned nuances by our genetically molded
articulatory apparatus. And when it comes to emotional language,
there are no rigorous standards that can easily assure agreement.
Just think about the different connotations that people have for
sympathy and empathy, which are clearly higher-level emotional
concepts. The point is, the science of primary-process animal
emotions will surely need a specialized terminology to minimize
confusion. And considering the layers of brain evolution
(symbolized by the upper-left triune-mind logo of Figure 1), we
need distinct labels for primary-process emotions and other affects,
which may be the gateway for understanding higher-order
affective principles. Before proceeding further, let us contemplate
the minimal levels of BrainMind organization that we need to
consider (Figure 3).
In neuroscience, primary-process emotional networks must be
defined partly in terms of empirically delineated neural and
behavioral criteria. For instance, we know that there are
subcortical emotional networks that can generate characteristic
emotional-instinctual, behaviorally-evident, somatically flexible
action patterns accompanied by vast autonomic-visceral changes
in the body (i.e., these circuits generate complex unconditioned
responses) that are initially ‘objectless’—they are activated only by a
few unconditioned stimuli. During natural emotional episodes,
behavioral and autonomic arousals outlast the precipitating
Figure 4. Overview of brain arousals and inhibitions. An overview of brain arousals (reds and yellows) and inhibitions (purples) depicted on
lateral surfaces of the right and left hemispheres (top of each panel) and medial surfaces of the corresponding hemispheres (bottom of each panel),
while humans experience various basic emotions evoked by autobiographical reminiscing: Upper left: sadness/GRIEF; upper right: happiness/JOY;
lower left: anger/RAGE; lower right: anxiety/FEAR (data from Damasio, et al. [38]; overall patterns of activation and inhibition graciously provided by
Antonio Damasio). To highlight the directionality of changes, as monitored by changes in blood flow, inhibitions are indicated by downward arrows
(predominating in neocortical regions), while arousals are depicted by upward arrows (predominantly in subcortical regions where emotional
behaviors can be evoked by brain stimulation in animals).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021236.g004
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using artificial brain stimulations nor well-controlled studies of
natural emotions (i.e., if affective states are sustained by cognitive
ruminations in humans, as they surely are, it would be harder to
evaluate those levels of control in animals). More speculatively,
such emotional arousals that gate/regulate and selectively process
sensory/perceptual inputs into the brain, are critical controls in
the acquisition of learned behaviors that may help program (and
disrupt) many higher brain cognitive/executive functions (cogni-
tions being defined as elaborations by the brain of sensory/
perceptual inputs from the external world). With emotional
maturation, the developmentally/epigenetically emergent (bot-
tom-up) higher brain functions come to eventually reciprocally
regulate (top-down) emotional arousals. Obviously, each level adds
complexities to the overall psychobiological equation.
By definition, emotional affects are subjectively experienced, but
this tells us nothing about how it all happens in the brain.
Although the full emotional package integrates influences from all
levels of the BrainMind (Figures 2 and 3), it is clear that the
primary-processes—the unconditioned emotional response ssy-
tems—are of critical importance in generating emotional feelings,
but it is not clear that anything at this low level of the brain
deserves the moniker ‘‘cognitive’’. To the best of our experimental
knowledge, primary-process emotional feelings—raw affects—
arise directly from genetically encoded emotional action networks
(emotional ‘operating’ systems). For instance when such emotion
circuits are activated in human brains, as by stimulation of the
periaqueductal gray (PAG) of the midbrain, intense feelings are
aroused, and they subside rapidly upon termination [26]
presumably because cognitive (secondary- and tertiary-process)
factors are not sustaining the effects. However, such arousals may
progressively lead to endophenotypic shifts in emotional temper-
aments, as might be evident in psychiatric disorders.
Overall, the data are consistent with a dual-aspect monism view
of underlying organization (resembling the dual faces of wave-
particle perspectives in physics)—that raw emotional behaviors
and their affects arise from the same subcortical neural dynamics.
These emotional circuits, generating both emotional behaviors
and feelings, anticipate key survival needs, and there is an
evolutionary anticipatory function for both the behaviors and their
primal affective feelings. They tell us promptly whether a course of
action may support survival (namely the various positive affects) or
hinder survival (the negative-aversive feelings). And in so doing,
they mediate what philosophers (e.g., Searle [33]) have called
‘‘intentions-in-action’’ (Figure 2).
But there are other types of affects than the emotional ones that
arise from the complex dynamics of brain networks. These others
are more closely related to sensory inputs—the pleasures and
displeasures of sensation. And besides the emotional and sensory
affects, there are various homeostatic affects of the body—the diverse
hungers and thirsts of the body that support somatic health. What
they have in common is that they all anticipate events that will help
or harm bodily survival. Pain tells us to back off from certain
activities, so as not to injure our bodies any further. These primal
affects are ancestral memories of mammalian brains—built into
the neural infrastructure to promote survival.
This essay will continue to focus exclusively on those within-
brain affects that are here called ‘‘primary-process emotions’’—
namely, those arising from complex action-integrating circuits
concentrated in subcortical regions of the brain. In a sense they
are most subtle since within-brain intrinsic precipitants may be
as common as external triggers, both by local tissue irritations
(subcortical epileptic foci) as well as higher cognitive inputs (e.g.,
ruminations mediated by medial frontal cortical regions [34,35]).
Thus, this essay summarizes affective neuroscience perspectives
on primary-process emotional affects of mammalian brains that
seem to unconditionally arise from the evolutionarily integrated,
primordial ‘‘instinctual’’ emotional operating systems of the
brain that regulate unconditioned emotional actions, which may
be more important in guiding simple emotional learning (e.g.,
fear-conditioning) than is currently recognized. This essay also
looks at secondary-process emotions arising from conditioning, both
classical and instrumental/operant. However, with our current
scientific tools, we can barely touch the tertiary-process emotion-
cognition integrations in animal-models that reflect our capacity
to think and ruminate about our lot in life, which are
concentrated in medial-frontal cortical regions. We are obviously
the most intellectually sophisticated of mammalian species, and
thus such higher neuroaffective issues are best studied in
humans, but that is not to say that the neocortical-cognitive
apparatus is able to generate any affects merely on its own. Its
major role is to regulate emotions—sustaining them with
rumination and dampening them with various regulatory
strategies that rely on cortical inhibition of subcortical processes,
what Aristotle called phronesis. Thus, the primordial sources of
emotional feelings, important as they are, cannot clarify the
whole emotional story.
But how shall we label the emotional primes (i.e., the distinct
primary-process unconditional emotional response potentials of
the brain)? Holistic MindBrain emotional processes—woven from
all evolutionary levels of mentation—have diverse vernacular
terms, such as anger, loneliness, anxiety, grief, hope, etc., all of
which are tertiary-process concepts. Thus, it would be an error to
use such terms to label the primary-process subcortical emotional-
affective functions, which in my estimation is the most important
level for understanding the evolutionary sources of both animal
and human emotion—namely, they are the fundamental level of
brain organization upon which the rest of the mental apparatus
relies [34]. So what terminologies shall we use to discuss that
foundational level so we do not indulge in mereological fallacies—
the attribution of the cause of a holistic body-brain-mind arousal
to a part of the body rather than to the whole?
This situation mandates a new terminological convention that
explicitly acknowledges levels of control but does not lose touch
with the foundational importance and nature of raw feelings.
Thus, here we follow the terminological choice made a long time
ago (full capitalization) for discussing the primary-process
emotions of mammalian minds—namely, the SEEKING, RAGE,
FEAR, LUST, CARE, PANIC/GRIEF and PLAY systems (for a
more complete description of each system, see Appendix S1, with
a summarization of key neuroanatomies and neurochemistries in
Figure 5). These labels, by using full-capitalization of terms, refer
to specific subcortical networks in mammalian brains that promote
specific categories of built-in emotional actions and associated
feelings. No claim is made of identity with the corresponding
vernacular words, although profound homologies are anticipated.
Although these systems can never be identical across species
(evolutionary diversity rules in all corners of body and mind), the
labeling does seek to acknowledge the existence of brain networks
that govern various class-similar emotional behaviors as well as
distinct types of class-similar affective experiences in all mammals.
Because of evolutionary diversification, we may never be able to
objectively describe the precise nature of affective feelings in either
humans or animals, but we can at least have confidence in the
existence of meaningful similarities in the anatomies, neurochem-
istries, and psychological functions of these systems across
mammalian species. This heuristic will illuminate the mental lives
of animals (Figure 4) as well as provide fundamental knowledge for
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psychiatric problems.
In sum, primordial emotional feelings are self-evidently highly
interactive with cognitive ‘propositional attitudes’ (each of us feels
strongly about specific emotion-provoking events we encounter in
the world), but such cognitive attitudes are much harder to study
rigorously in animals. Clearly, the cognitive mind of animals is less
experimentally penetrable at a causal neuroscientific level than the
primal affective mind. The above convention for labeling
emotional primes may help us sustain clarity of discussion while
minimizing mereological fallacies, namely part-whole confusions.
Because the brain is an evolutionarily layered organ, unlike any
other in the body, we must also envision how the various
‘hierarchical’ levels seamlessly inter-digitate with each other
(Figure 3)—in a sense the evolutionary layers of neural networks
are completely inter-penetrant (nested-hierarchies) in the intact
brain [2,34]. Thus, key aspects of lower controls are ‘‘re-
represented’’ within the higher levels of control. In this view,
during early development the evolutionarily earlier functions (e.g.,
the unconditioned aspects) provide bottom-up control of higher
emotional functions. To put it in other words, lower integrations
are functionally embedded in higher functions that emerged later
in the evolution of the brain. In this manner, earlier/lower brain
functions constrain and guide what the more subtle higher brain
functions can achieve, which gradually yield diverse higher-order
emotions that are hard to study in animals, from envy to shades of
jealousy and resentments. Such thoroughly cognitivized tertiary-
processes, thought-related emotions, engendered culturally by
social learning are, at present, next to impossible to study
rigorously at causal levels and most certainly not in animal models.
From a neuroevolutionary perspective, these ‘beehives’ of nested
hierarchies allow lower-level controls to maintain some kind of
primacy in the overall functionality of higher brain networks, albeit
perhaps not in the immediate control of behavior when the
BrainMind has fully matured. It is likely that the primary
processes, upon which organismic-behavioral coherence is based,
continue to anticipate immediate survival issues, which are then
passed on to higher levels via learning-conditioning (secondary-
processes), thereby providing information for higher working-
memory mechanisms, as in dorsolateral frontal cortical regions,
that permit tertiary-process deliberative cognitions. Higher forms
of consciousness allow humans to plan farther into the future,
based on past experiences, than is possible for most other animals.
Human planning can use memories that go back toward
childhood. This is what is called autonoetic consciousness, in the
terminology of Endel Tulving [36], namely being aware of one’s
own life-line from one’s personal storehouse of memories of the
past and hopes for the future. Some believe that a cross-species
affective neuroscience strategy attempts to marginalize those
cortically-mediated cognitive-emotional issues. That has never
been the case. But if we understand the evolution of the brain, we
can more sensitively consider how the higher functional levels are
developmentally/epigenetically constructed.
Such hierarchically nested schemes may also help us better
appreciate various dilemmas in conceptualizing higher-brain
functions and the participation of such functions in psychiatric
disorders (see below). Scientific study of animals can only inform us
well about the operations of the bottom two levels, with the
primary-level being the source of raw (cognitively-unmodulated)
affects, and the many unconscious mechanisms of secondary-
processing (learning & memory) providing adaptive temporal-
spatial patterning of the primary-process affective potentials which
arise from lower layers of the BrainMind. What kind of additional
affective resolution the tertiary-process level may add is currently
Figure 5. Overview of key neuroanatomies and neurochemistries of the primary-process emotional networks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021236.g005
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symbolically’ in infinite variations with personal thoughts and
impressions to yield the full complexity of our affective lives,
constructing profound jealousies, demoralizing shame and guilt,
abject desires, and joyous hopes and aspirations—the full human
range of affective life from suffering to serene wisdom (phronesis,a s
Aristotle called it; ‘mindfulness’ in modern parlance). This
hierarchical vision may also illuminate why investigators working
at different hierarchical levels rather commonly do not recognize
how their contributions fit into and synergize with different levels
of analysis. This evolutionary scheme allows us to envision how the
‘‘construction’’ of higher emotional complexities can even emerge
via individual conceptual acts, while not pretending that
conceptual acts are the whole story [37]. When we come to the
highest layers of the BrainMind, most developed in humans,
higher emotion-cognition interactions permit humans the imagi-
nation to pursue an almost infinite variety of creative endeavors.
However, those higher brain functions may achieve nothing
without the ancestral affective foundations of our lower minds—
the primary affective processes we share with other mammals.
The Cross-Species Affective Foundations of Emotional
Feelings
Without clear neuroevolutionary approaches, we simply cannot
understand the sources of either human or animal emotional
feelings and hence how they contribute to emotional disorders and
to various issues of animal welfare. In using such cross-species
research strategies, we must explicitly recognize that brains, as
evolutionarily layered organs, have clear imprints of evolutionary
progressions within their anatomical and neurochemical organi-
zations [2,14,23]. To summarize, the earliest brain mechanisms
remain medially and caudally situated in brains—in their ancestral
locations—with most recent developments added rostrally and
laterally. Functionally, what emerged earlier remains foundational
for later developments, probably ‘‘re-represented’’ in the nested
hierarchies noted earlier (Figure 3). The ancient subcortical locus
of human feelings has also been found to be subcortically situated
(Figure 4), by Damasio and colleagues [38].
As we recognize such nested levels of control within the
BrainMind, we should abandon the classic conclusion found in
studies on consciousness that subjective experiences arise only
from higher MindBrain regions, although our ‘‘awareness’’ of such
experiences may be so controlled. Obviously, the lower,
phenomenally experienced brain functions (e.g., basic emotions
and motivations) are more robustly controlled by inheritance.
Higher levels, through social-developmental experiences, add
additional layers of control. Lifetime learning can promote
increasing ‘plasticity’ of psychological strategies and emotional
sentiments that can lead to various moral emotions—from
empathy to felt principles of justice. Such accretions of higher
mental functions cannot be well-studied neuroscientifically, but the
other animals also do seem to have intrinsic moralities [39], as well
as capacities to resonate with the distress of others [40]. These
moralities are probably expressed in the capacity of animals to
develop perceptually driven affective resonance with others—the
mammalian social principles that allow LUST to become love, for
CARE and PLAY to cement social-support networks and
friendships, and PANIC/GRIEF to provide institutional support
structures that allow shared grief to help heal the psychological
pain that might otherwise cascade into depression.
To summarize the upshot of this vision: In discussing the neural
control of emotional behaviors and feelings in humans and other
animals, we can usefully parse levels of control into i) primary
processes—in behaviorist parlance, the ‘instinctual’ unconditioned
stimuli (UCSs) and unconditioned responses (UCRs) of the
BrainMind; ii) secondary processes, which reflect the plasticity
added by basic mechanisms of conditioned learning and memory;
and iii) in some highly cerebrated species, tertiary processes
(thoughts, deliberations, etc.), allowing them (and us) to be ‘aware’
of and to reflect upon more primal experiences. A general
principle is that mammals are much more similar (albeit never
identical) in their subcortical network organizations while being
more diversified at higher levels, with the greatest differences
occurring at tertiary-process cortical levels.
Clearly, the most recent, tertiary-process layers of MindBrain
control can only be well studied in humans. Those higher controls
are largely ‘‘cognitive’’ because they rely heavily on the processing
of external information. Still, both affective and behavioral
neuroscience are more effective in scientifically illuminating the
first two levels of control, with studies of secondary controls being
especially well defined by studies of the brain mechanisms of fear
conditioning (e.g., LeDoux [41]; Maren [42]). In contrast,
remarkably few have studied the primary-process feelings and
neural organizations [6,43], and how they may actually promote
the learning mechanisms of the brain.
It is important to recognize that the primary-process level is not
‘unconscious’ if one defines consciousness as the ability to have
internal experiences. From the tertiary-process level the primary-
processes may be deemed preconscious, because by itself the
foundational level may not be able to be ‘‘aware’’ of its own
consciousness—those subcortical emotional networks cannot
elaborate what Tulving called noetic (knowing) consciousness.
The primal level can only mediate anoetic consciousness—
experience without knowing, but intensely experienced nonethe-
less. We call this level of experience, affective consciousness [43].
To reiterate, direct ESB-induced activations of these anoetic
circuits yield diverse ‘rewards’ and ‘punishments’ that guide
learning, and in humans, we know that the feelings by such brain
stimulations are stronger than those produced by stimulating any
other regions of the brain. The secondary learning processes may
be largely unconscious, simply the parsing of feelings into diverse
temporal and spatial frameworks of individual lives. Tertiary
processes are hence mixtures of raw primal experiences and
unconscious learning processes, working synergistically in working
memory, that yield yet other subtleties (e.g., theories of mind—
whereby we are concerned with the thoughts of others). Tertiary
processes also allow the higher brain to develop networks of social
knowledge, as instantiated in mirror neurons—nerve cells that fire
both when an animal/human does something as well as when
another animal/human views that something being done.
However, there is currently no data indicating that those higher
mental abilities reflect intrinsic brain capacities, as opposed to ones
that emerge via social learning.
In any event, to understand how the whole BrainMind operates,
we must ultimately consider how higher and lower levels of control
participate in the regulation of the whole [34]. We do not yet have
good neuroscientific models for that, except for human brain
imaging along with some more direct measures of neural activities
[44] and, of course, verbal self-reports of experiences. Regardless,
all levels need to be existentially integrated for a balanced life. The
main tools for achieving full integration of levels scientifically
might eventually be through the creative use of massive databases
where genetic, neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and functional
information can be statistically integrated.
The Conundrum of Anoetic Affective Consciousness
There are no good reasons to think that emotional-feeling
mechanisms have sprung up uniquely in human brains, although
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memory [45]. The weight of evidence clearly indicates that many
affects arise from subcortical brain functions that all mammals
share. On that score, cross-species affective neuroscience has
already done quite well (e.g., Alcaro and colleagues [35], Damasio
and coworkers [38], Mobbs and associates [46], Northoff and
colleagues [47,48] and Zubieta and coworkers [49], to name just a
few).
Thus, the real problem is not an epistemological barrier but
rather our failure to deal frankly with the emotional lives of the
other animals. Stated another way, the problem lies more with the
history of our field than with the quantity and quality of the
evidence. Indeed, some prominent investigators who traditionally
supposed that higher-brain functions generate emotional feelings
have now tentatively recognized the critical roles of subcortical loci
(e.g., Damasio [50]).
The fact that subjective states cannot be empirically observed as
directly as behavior should no longer be seen as an insurmountable
dilemma. Modern neuroscience can probe such hidden functions
of the brain using theoretical strategies that are not all that
different conceptually from those that guided the maturation of
quantum physics. Certain processes in nature (all the way from the
mechanisms of gravity to the feelings of animals) may never be
observed directly, and they can only be probed and illuminated by
focusing on objective external signs, indirect measures, that lead to
novel predictions. Measures of emotional vocalizations may be
among the best methods to achieve this in predictions that go from
animals to humans [51–56]. To take one example: Rats make two
general broad categories of emotional vocalizations at frequencies
that humans can’t hear: i) long 22-kHz-type ‘‘complaint’’
vocalizations when confronted by various aversive situations, and
ii) short 50 kHz-type ‘‘chirps’’ that signal some kind of positive
affect. Clearly those ‘‘complaint’’ networks are situated in
affectively negative brain regions such as the dorsal PAG. In
contrast, when we evoke the positive ‘‘chirps’’ in rats using ESB, at
every brain location where such ‘happy/excited/euphoric’ sounds
are evoked, animals will self-stimulate through those electrodes
[52]. Thus, we can infer that those emotional sounds directly
monitor the affective states of animals.
Toward a Deeper Psychobiology of the Animal Mind
Epistemological rigor dictates that those theoretical views that
can generate the most novel predictions and affirmative observa-
tions should rule. That is the time-honored scientific approach to
probing the deeper levels of nature that simply cannot be directly
observed. For historical reasons, from Cartesian dualism to the
dogma of radical behaviorism to the ‘computational theory of
mind’ computer-driven cognitive revolution [57], the weight of
evidence has not yet had an impact on our discussion of animal
feelings, although empirical support for diverse primary-process
affective feelings within the brains of all mammals has been
available for a long time [2,3,6,58].
That such evidence has been slow to gain acceptance is not, in
fact, surprising. Among obvious precedents, consider insights from
Galileo to Darwin. A poignant more recent example is the fact that
it took the biological community a decade to accept DNA as the
hereditary material, despite compelling data provided by Oswald
Avery (1877–1955) and colleagues that was published in 1944.
The delay arose largely because most scholars believed that only
proteins had the requisite complexity to mediate something as
complex as genetic inheritance.
Currently, perhaps largely because of the pervasive influence of
the James-Lange theory of emotions [59], it is still widely believed
that emotional feelings reflect the brain’s ability to detect bodily
emotional expressions [45], even though evidence at the primary-
process level for such an idea remains slim (albeit such processes
may be present at learned, secondary-process levels of control
[60]). Many investigators still believe that emotional experiences
largely reflect higher-brain sensory and homeostatic affective
functions–such as those that transpire in frontal, and especially
insular, cortices (e.g., Craig [61]). And yet there is precious little
causal data to believe that those higher BrainMind levels are the
fonts of raw emotional experiences in neural evolution. Indeed,
although there is a mass of data implicating the insula in the
mediation of pain, the quality of taste, and various somatosensory
and interoceptive bodily feelings, this should not be taken to mean
that primal emotional feelings—RAGE, FEAR, PANIC/GRIEF,
PLAY etc. (see Appendix S1) — are constructed there. Although
these brain regions routinely ‘‘light up’’ in imaging of the human
brain during various emotional tasks, damage to these areas
typically does not dramatically impair the capacity for humans to
have emotional experiences. As Damasio ([50] p. 77–78) recently
noted: ‘‘Complete destruction of the insular cortices, from front to
back, in both left and right cerebral hemispheres, does not result in
a complete abolition of feeling. On the contrary, feelings of pain
and pleasure remain. . . Patients report discomfort with
temperature extremes; they are displeased by boring tasks and
are annoyed when their requests are refused. The social reactivity
that depends on the presence of emotional feelings is not
compromised. Attachment is maintained even to persons who
cannot be recognized as loved ones and friends because . . . of
concomitant damage to. . . temporal lobes which severely
compromises autobiographical memory.’’
And one can also note that electrical stimulation of those insular
regions is not especially robust in evoking strong emotional states of
consciousness in humans, although painful sensory-affective
feelings are commonly experienced [62]. In contrast, subcortical
stimulations evoke coherent emotional behaviors, including
especially strong emotional vocalizations in animals and strong
emotional states in humans [25,26]. Historical reconstruction of
the neuronal connectivities of brain areas where stereotactic
lesions have been used effectively to treat depressed individuals
who have not responded to conventional therapies highlights the
convergence of inputs to primal positive emotional networks such
as the SEEKING system [63].
Results and Discussion
Conclusions
The issue of whether other animals have internally felt
experiences that contribute to behavioral control has vexed
behavioral science since its inception. Although most investigators
remain agnostic on such contentious issues, there is now abundant
experimental evidence indicating that all mammals have nega-
tively and positively-valenced emotional networks concentrated in
homologous brain regions that may mediate affective experiences
when animals are emotionally aroused. The relevant lines of
evidence are as follows:
1) Brain scientists can evoke powerful emotional responses by
localized ESB applied to distinct brain regions, similar across
all mammalian species ever tested. At least 7 types of
emotional arousal can be so evoked, and we refer to the
underlying systems with a special nomenclature—SEEK-
ING, RAGE, FEAR, LUST, CARE, PANIC/GRIEF and
PLAY.
2) These subcortical structures are homologous among all
mammals that have been tested. If one arouses the FEAR
Decoding Primal Affective Experiences of Animals
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 11 September 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 9 | e21236system, all species studied exhibit similar highly negative
emotional responses with differences, of course, in species-
typical details.
3) All of these basic emotional urges, from FEAR to social
PLAY, remain intact after radical neo-decortication early in
life; thus, the neocortex is not essential for the generation of
primary-process emotionality.
4) ESB evoked emotional arousals are not psychologically
neutral, since all can serve as ‘rewards’ and ‘punishments’ in
motivating learning; such affective preferences are especially
well indexed by conditioned place preferences and place
aversions as well as by animals’ eagerness to turn such ESBs
on or off.
5) Comparably localized ESB of human brains yield congruent
affective experiences—felt emotional arousals that typically
appear without reason. In concert with the animal data, this
provides robust evidence for emotional experiences in
animals exhibiting primary species-typical (instinctual)
emotional arousals, and suggests a dual-aspect monism
strategy whereby instinctual emotional behavior sequences
can serve as proxies for emotional feelings in animals.
Obviously, we can only ask if animals experience something by
seeing if such states matter to animals. Will they choose to turn
these states on or off? Will they return to or avoid locations where
such states were artificially evoked (conditioned place preferences
and aversions)? If such intrinsic brain ‘rewards’ and ‘punishments’
are not experienced by other mammals, then we truly have a much
bigger puzzle, a truly profound scientific dilemma, on our hands:
How could rewards and punishments, routinely experienced by
humans, control animal behavior through unconscious neural
mechanisms? By simply postulating a spooky unconscious process
called ‘‘reinforcement’’? In humans, strong emotions can only be
evoked from neural terrain that is demonstrably ancient and
homologous in all mammals. Why would such states evoked from
subcortical regions of human brains be much different from those
in animal brains? Because of neocortical, cognitive ‘readout’
abilities? That is a supposition that creates more conundrums than
it currently solves.
Perhaps the biggest contribution of cross-species affective
neuroscience research is to decisively return other mammals to
their proper status as conscious, feeling beings. This knowledge
can provide new information about psychiatric disorders, and a
fuller understanding of the neural sources of human affective states
(e.g., [64,65]). But this knowledge also forces us to face ethical
dilemmas. The implications of such knowledge for how we live
with the other creatures of the world are vast. It is clear that the
subcortical powers of our mind—the diverse affective systems that
guide our basic living patterns—allow us to feel vibrantly alive as
well as gloomy despair. These same systems mediate diverse
species typical experiences of ‘rewards’ and ‘punishments’, which
may be affectively quite similar across species.
One implication of this line of research is that we may never
understand the affective depths of our humanity if we ignore our
primary-process emotional continuities with non-human animals.
This naturalistic, but still novel scientific view of animal minds
should help clarify the nature of our own mental lives. If so, it may
have enormous implications for the way we raise our children,
treat each other and ourselves, and how we shall respect the
animals with whom we must find better ways to share the earth.
Denouement
I write this closing section partly in response to a reviewer of this
article who suggested that I had not been fair about the level of
scientific work that is being pursued on animal emotions these
days. As a point of clarification, I wish to distinguish animal
behavior-only and behavioral neuroscience research on emotions,
which is a very vast and valuable literature, but not one premised
on the direct study of emotional feelings in animals. In contrast,
affective neuroscience strategies seek to lay out causal/constitutive
strategies to understand the underlying ‘mechanisms’ of affective
experiences in mammalian brains. It is noteworthy that primary-
process emotions research can be conducted on fully anesthetized
animals, for some indices such as appetitive sniffing are still
expressed under full anesthesia.
In this essay perhaps I have not conveyed the high level of
interest that exists in the study of emotions outside the realm of
neuroscience, especially among some animal behaviorists. There
are abundant articles on subtle higher-order emotional processes
such as empathy, imitation, and fairness, just to name a few, and
certainly there is increasing work on animal emotional behaviors.
Indeed, Marion Dawkins [66] and Franz de Waal [67] have long
advocated work on various emotional behaviors of animals, while
expressing doubt whether we can make a science out of their
emotional states. If one reads these eminent scholars carefully, it is
easy to understand why they hesitate to talk about or even support
talk about emotional experiences, and implicitly fall back on the
agnostic dictum advanced by Nico Tinbergen: ‘‘Because subjective
phenomena cannot be observed objectively in animals, it is idle to
claim or deny their existence’’ (vide supra).
For instance, Dawkins and de Waal have been quite explicit
that it is quite impossible to fathom, scientifically, the qualitative
experiential nature of animal minds. For instance in her wonderful
1993 book Through Our Eyes Only?, Dawkins questions whether we
can experimentally support the contention that animals have true
emotional feelings, and does so in all subsequent writings I have
read. For instance in her 2001 discussion of ‘‘Who Needs
Consciousness?’’ she ends by saying ‘‘it is important to be clear
where observable facts about behavior and physiology end and
assumptions about subjective experiences in other species begin.
However plausible the assumption that other species have
conscious experiences somewhat like ours is, that assumption
cannot be tested in the same way that we can test theories about
behavior, hormones or brain activity’’ ([66] p. S28). de Waal has
done the same, with some softening of that perspective (see end of
this ‘‘Denouement’’).
Their nuanced points of view miss my point: A causal
neuroscientific analysis has changed the ‘ballgame’. We can now
make a variety of testable predictions about the experiential
aspects of artificial arousal of brain emotional circuits and how
such knowledge can impact human experiences. Now it is no
longer a matter of argumentation, but the ‘‘weight of evidence’’!
And that is all science ever has. At present the weight of evidence,
based on predictions that have been made, is overwhelmingly for
the side of animal affective experiences, with hardly a feather of
support for the other side. Scientists, being ultimate skeptics,
should honor the rules of the science game, and accept that the
neuroscientific evidence now dramatically supports the existence
of diverse affective feelings. Acceptance of the evidence opens up
the real possibility that we can decode the foundations of human
emotions through the study of animal brain functions.
Other scientists working more in the popular vein, especially
Marc Bekoff [39], have had no such hesitations; he suggests that
our sympathy for nature, along with observations of the nuances of
animal behaviors, are sufficient to cross the trans-species mental
bridge. I agree as a person, but not as a scientist, especially since
the science now provides a solid bridge for individuals who have
great emotional sensitivity to other animals to employ scientifically
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instance, I remember sitting around a campfire with three friends
and visiting members of an elephant conservancy group at the
Timbavati Reserve adjoining Kruger Park in South Africa in the
fall of 2008. These protectors of the elephants were worrying
about how many people keep telling them that other animals,
including elephants, do not have emotional feelings, only humans
do. I explained how the scientific data from affective neuroscience
empirically negates those traditional beliefs, and shared how a
strong rebuttal of those ingrained beliefs simply requires the
accurate communication of already existing evidence—data of the
type already discussed here.
My argument is that sensitive positions that are concurrently
liberal at emotional behavioral levels but conservative at phenom-
enological scientific levels, such as those advanced by Dawkins and
de Waal, may still be appropriate for higher-order cognitive aspects of
animal mental lives (e.g., their possible cognitions and thoughts), but
that skepticism should no longer apply to their emotional feelings
(affects). This is simply because the valenced neural infrastructure of
affective states has been well studied with traditional functional
neuroscientific methods [2], which provide the scientific evidence
for the current arguments. Since this kind of science requires neural
investigations, and few animal behaviorists pursue such work, it is
understandable that they have not fully weighed the many
opportunities to go down to the subjective level empirically with the
aid of neuroscience. That would not only support their own views
about the importance of emotions in animal lives, but also provide
an epistemology for further progress. Strangely, they have not yet
seized that empirical opportunity, nor recognized the robust
experimental strategies neuroscience provides. As a result, the
power of a very traditional form of skepticism currently continues to
outweigh the evidence even in the minds of the most sensitive
investigators of animal behavior.
This does not mean that we can read animal minds in any
detail, but we can read the affective arousals and the types of
valences that permeate their minds. When integrated with
comparable human research—work that is routinely happening
in the context of neurosurgery for various disorders (Parkinson’s
disease, depression, etc.) with therapeutic deep brain stimulation—
we can also make concrete predictions, and thereby obtain
corroboratory evidence [68] about homologous class-similarities in
our affective experiences. The massive subcortical concentration of
affective circuits suggests that such BrainMind capacities evolved
long before the more recent radiations of mammalian diversity.
Species diversity surely means there will be many differences in the
types, durations and intensities of emotional feelings among
different species and different individuals (including humans), but
this does not markedly reduce the possibility of discovering general
principles that work across species.
To my knowledge neither Dawkins nor de Waal has considered
their ‘‘subjectivist dilemma’’ of other minds, whether in humans or
other animals, and recognized how severely it hinders the
acceptance of the affective neuroscience perspective advocated
here. Thus, the empirical study of emotional feelings has been a
workable probleminneuroscienceforsome time,althoughfewhave
‘‘taken the plunge’’ so to speak. There are now abundant cross-
species neuro-affective predictions that can be made [2,65,68].
On the other hand, various scholars, writing in the popular
mode, such as Temple Grandin [1,63], and most prominently
Marc Bekoff [39] accept the reality of animal feelings. But these
scholars, and many others with enlightened views, have not
pursued neuroscientific research on emotional processes. Hence
their important advocacies of seemingly self-evident intuitions are
not the same as advancing the rigorous predictions allowed by
neuroscientific approaches. Neuroscience, after all, is the only way
to verify such constructs and also to illuminate what it means,
mechanistically (constitutively), to have subjective experiences.
Hopefully my forceful arguments in behalf of affective neurosci-
ence strategies, contextualized in hopefully an accurate portrayal
of historical antecedents, will not be envisioned as mere complaints
or empirically unjustified anthropomorphism. The intent is to
advance the science of mind.
We can finally capitalize on evidence-based neuroevolutionary
strategies to understand other minds, not only to illuminate the
affective mentalities of other creatures, but also to better
understand our own. Why are such endeavors so important?
Such knowledge has remarkable potential to advance the
understanding of our own emotional feelings, scientifically,
perhaps for the first time in human history. With this knowledge
we can advance psychiatric insights and aspire to scientifically
respect the minds of other creatures—understanding how they
could feel their emotions as intensely as we do.
Of course the terms used in consciousness studies—sentience,
awareness, subjectivity, affects, feelings—cannot be precise, and
are, no doubt, used differently by different scholars. For me the
simplest and easiest is the word ‘‘experience’’—namely certain
brain states feel like something subjectively, and thus deserve to be
called phenomenally conscious. Of course, others may only choose
to use the term conscious, when animals can be shown to be
‘‘aware of’’ (can think and reflect upon) their experiences. I think
that is too biased and shortsighted a view.
If one uses the concept of consciousness phenomenally, anchored
simply by the existence of subjective experiences, it seems likely that
primary-process consciousness comes in two major varieties—
cognitive (linked to exteroceptive, perception-generating sensory
inputs) and affective (internal states that feel good and bad in
distinct ways). If so, as we consider the evolutionary layering of the
BrainMind (Figure 2), we should recognize that affective functions
are more medial in the brain than external perceptual ones,
suggesting that affect is more ancient, and hence would have had
priority in the construction of the mental apparatus. Perhaps the
term ‘‘awareness’’ should be reserved just for higher forms of
perceptual consciousness. By my wits, sensory perceptions, in some
currently unknown way, may have arisen from the pre-existing
neural platform for affective neurodynamics [2,6,43]. If so,
affective experiential states may still be independent of the cognitive
knowledge that you are experiencing such brain states.
In closing, I would note that just as the final revision of this
manuscript was completed, a fine paper on this topic by Franz de
Waal appeared [67] which presents a compelling argument for
scientists to develop a renewed interest in emotions but in ways
that ‘‘avoid unanswerable questions and to view emotions as
mental and bodily states that potentiate behavior appropriate to
environmental challenges’’ (p. 191). In this paper de Waal
provides a compelling argument for the importance of animal
emotions, while not crossing the Rubicon to discussions of
emotional experiences.
As de Waal now expresses, in a toned down way compared to
an earlier version of the manuscript (I was a reviewer), we can
study animal emotions ‘‘without knowing much of anything about
associated experiences’’ (p. 199) and that ‘‘the greatest obstacle to
the study of animal emotions is the common objection that ‘‘we
cannot know what they feel.’’ While this is undeniably true, we
should realize that such problems also hold for fellow human
beings (p. 199). But affective neuroscience strategies now provide
the needed ‘‘weight of evidence’’ indicating that animals do ‘‘feel’’
although, admittedly, we cannot be very precise about the
experienced nature of their feelings, above and beyond several
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brains allow them to feel good and bad in various ways will, one
day, inform us scientifically, for the first time, about the nature of
our own feelings. The cross-species ethical consequences of this
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